Saturday, January 14, 2017
Assad linked to Syrian chemical attacks for first time
Investigators have linked Assad and other high-ranking figures to a series of chlorine bomb attacks in 2014-15
REUTERS
Link
REUTERS
Link
International investigators have said for the first time that they suspect President Bashar al-Assad and his brother are responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict, according to a document seen by Reuters.
A joint inquiry for the United Nations and global watchdog the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had previously identified only military units and did not name any commanders or officials.
Now a list has been produced of individuals whom the investigators have linked to a series of chlorine bomb attacks in 2014-15 - including Assad, his younger brother Maher and other high-ranking figures - indicating the decision to use toxic weapons came from the very top, according to a source familiar with the inquiry.
The Assads could not be reached for comment, but a Syrian government official said accusations that government forces had used chemical weapons had "no basis in truth". The government has repeatedly denied using such weapons during the civil war, which is almost six years old, saying all the attacks highlighted by the inquiry were the work of rebels or the Islamic State militant group.
The list, which has been seen by Reuters but has not been made public, was based on a combination of evidence compiled by the UN-OPCW team in Syria and information from Western and regional intelligence agencies, according to the source, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the issue.
Reuters was unable to independently review the evidence or to verify it.
The UN-OPCW inquiry, known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), is led by a panel of three independent experts, supported by a team of technical and administrative staff. It is mandated by the UN Security Council to identify individuals and organizations responsible for chemical attacks in Syria.
Virginia Gamba, the head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, denied any list of individual suspects had yet been compiled by the inquiry.
"There are no ... identification of individuals being considered at this time," she told Reuters by email.
The use of chemical weapons is banned under international law and could constitute a war crime.
While the inquiry has no judicial powers, any naming of suspects could lead to their prosecution. Syria is not a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), but alleged war crimes could be referred to the court by the Security Council - although splits among global powers over the war make this a distant prospect at present.
"The ICC is concerned about any country where crimes are reported to be committed," a spokesman for the court said when asked for comment. "Unless Syria accepts the ICC jurisdiction, the only way that [the] ICC would have jurisdiction over the situation would be through a referral by the Security Council."
The list seen by Reuters could form the basis for the inquiry team's investigations this year, according to the source. It is unclear whether the United Nations or OPCW will publish the list separately.
'Highest levels'
The list identifies 15 people "to be scrutinized in relation to use of CW [chemical weapons] by Syrian Arab Republic Armed Forces in 2014 and 2015". It does not specify what role they are suspected of playing but lists their titles.
It is split into three sections. The first, titled "Inner Circle President," lists six people including Assad, his brother, who commands the elite 4th Armoured Division, the defense minister and the head of military intelligence.
The second section names the air force chief as well as four commanders of air force divisions. They include the heads of the 22nd Air Force Division and the 63rd Helicopter Brigade, units that the inquiry has previously said dropped chlorine bombs.
The third part of the list, "Other relevant Senior Mil Personnel," names two colonels and two major-generals.
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, an independent specialist in biological and chemical weapons who monitors Syria, told Reuters the list reflected the military chain of command.
"The decisions would be made at the highest levels initially and then delegated down. Hence the first use would need to be authorized by Assad," said de Bretton-Gordon, a former commander of British and NATO chemical and biological defense divisions who frequently visits Syria for professional consultancy work.
The Syrian defense ministry and air force could not be reached for comment.
Chlorine barrel bombs
Syria joined the international Chemical Weapons Convention under a US-Russian deal that followed the deaths of hundreds of civilians in a sarin gas attack in Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus in August 2013.
It was the deadliest use of chemicals in global warfare since the 1988 Halabja massacre at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, which killed at least 5,000 people in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Syrian government, which denied its forces were behind the Ghouta attack, also agreed to hand over its declared stockpile of 1,300 tonnes of toxic weaponry and dismantle its chemical weapons program under international supervision.
The United Nations and OPCW have been investigating whether Damascus is adhering to its commitments under the agreement, which averted the threat of U.S.-led military intervention.
The bodies appointed the panel of experts to conduct the inquiry, and its mandate runs until November. The panel published a report in October last year which said Syrian government forces used chemical weapons at least three times in 2014-2015 and that Islamic State used mustard gas in 2015.
The October report identified Syria's 22nd Air Force Division and 63rd Helicopter Brigade as having dropped chlorine bombs and said people "with effective control in the military units ... must be held accountable".
The source familiar with the inquiry said the October report had clearly established the institutions responsible and that the next step was to go after the individuals.
Washington on Thursday blacklisted 18 senior Syrian officials based on the UN-OPCW inquiry's October report, some of whom also appear on the list but not Assad or his brother.
The issue of chemical weapons use in Syria has become a deeply political one, and the UN-OPCW inquiry's allegations of chlorine bomb attacks by government forces have split the UN Security Council's veto-wielding members.
The United States, Britain and France have called for sanctions against Syria, while Assad's ally Russia has said the evidence presented is insufficient to justify such measures.
A Security Council resolution would be required to bring Assad and other senior Syrian officials before the International Criminal Court for any possible war crimes prosecution, something Russia would likely block.
Friday, January 13, 2017
Iran's Syria project: pushing population shifts to increase influence
Iran seeks arch of control from Tehran to Israel’s border by moving Shia communities into areas where Sunnis have fled or been forced out
The Guardian
Civilians being evacuated from Darayya in 2016. Shia families from Iraq later moved into the abandoned neighbourhoods. Photograph: Omar Sanadiki/Reuters Link
The Guardian
In the valleys between Damascus and Lebanon, where whole communities had abandoned their lives to war, a change is taking place. For the first time since the conflict broke out, people are starting to return.
But the people settling in are not the same as those who fled during the past six years.
The new arrivals have a different allegiance and faith to the predominantly Sunni Muslim families who once lived there. They are, according to those who have sent them, the vanguard of a move to repopulate the area with Shia Muslims not just from elsewhere in Syria, but also from Lebanon and Iraq.
The population swaps are central to a plan to make demographic changes to parts of Syria, realigning the country into zones of influence that backers of Bashar al-Assad, led by Iran, can directly control and use to advance broader interests. Iranis stepping up its efforts as the heat of the conflict starts to dissipate and is pursuing a very different vision to Russia, Assad’s other main backer.
Russia, in an alliance with Turkey, is using a nominal ceasefire to push for a political consensus between the Assad regime and the exiled opposition. Iran, meanwhile, has begun to move on a project that will fundamentally alter the social landscape of Syria, as well as reinforcing the Hezbollah stronghold of north-eastern Lebanon, and consolidating its influence from Tehran to Israel’s northern border.
“Iran and the regime don’t want any Sunnis between Damascus and Homs and the Lebanese border,” said one senior Lebanese leader. “This represents a historic shift in populations.”
Key for Iran are the rebel-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya, where Damascus residents took summer breaks before the war. Since mid-2015 their fate has been the subject of prolonged negotiations between senior Iranian officials and members of Ahrar al-Sham, the dominant anti-Assad opposition group in the area and one of the most powerful in Syria.
Talks in Istanbul have centred on a swap of residents from two Shia villages west of Aleppo, Fua and Kefraya, which have both been bitterly contested over the past three years. Opposition groups, among them jihadis, had besieged both villages throughout the siege of Aleppo, attempting to tie their fate to the formerly rebel-held eastern half of the city.
The swap, according to its architects, was to be a litmus test for more extensive population shifts, along the southern approaches to Damascus and in the Alawite heartland of Syria’s north-west, from where Assad draws much of his support.
Labib al-Nahas, the chief of foreign relations for Ahrar al-Sham, who led negotiations in Istanbul, said Tehran was seeking to create areas it could control. “Iran was very ready to make a full swap between the north and south. They wanted a geographical continuation into Lebanon. Full sectarian segregation is at the heart of the Iranian project in Syria. They are looking for geographical zones that they can fully dominate and influence. This will have repercussions on the entire region.
“[The sieges of] Madaya and Zabadani became the key issue to prevent the opposition from retaking Fua and Kefraya, which have exclusive populations of Shia. Hezbollah consider this a security zone and a natural extension of their territory in Lebanon. They have had very direct orders from the spiritual leadership of Iran to protect them at any cost.”
Iran has been especially active around all four towns through its Hezbollah proxies. Along the ridgelines between Lebanon’s Bekaa valley and into the outskirts of Damascus, Hezbollah has been a dominant presence, laying siege to Madaya and Zabadani and reinforcing the Syrian capital. Wadi Barada to the north-west, where ongoing fighting is in breach of the Russian-brokered ceasefire, is also part of the calculations, sources within the Lebanon-based movement have confirmed.
Elsewhere in Syria, demographic swaps are also reshaping the geopolitical fabric of communities that, before the war, had coexisted for centuries. In Darayya, south-west of Damascus, more than 300 Iraqi Shia families moved into neighbourhoods abandoned by rebels last August as part of a surrender deal. Up to 700 rebel fighters were relocated to Idlib province and state media announced within days that the Iraqis had arrived.
Shia shrines in Darayya and Damascus have been a raison d’etre for the presence of Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Shia groups. The Sayeda Zainab mosque on the capital’s western approach has been heavily fortified by Hezbollah and populated by families of the militant group, who have moved in since late 2012. Tehran has also bought large numbers of homes near the Zainab mosque, and a tract of land, which it is using to create a security buffer – a microcosm of its grander project.
Abu Mazen Darkoush, a former FSA commander who fled Zabadani for Wadi Barada said Damascus’s largest Islamic shrine, the Umayyad mosque, was now also a security zone controlled by Iranian proxies. “There are many Shia who were brought into the area around the mosque. It is a Sunni area but they plan for it to be secured by Shias, then surrounded by them.”
Senior officials in neighbouring Lebanon have been monitoring what they believe has been a systematic torching of Land Registry offices in areas of Syria recaptured on behalf of the regime. A lack of records make it difficult for residents to prove home ownership. Offices are confirmed to have been burned in Zabadani, Darayya, Syria’s fourth city, Homs, and Qusayr on the Lebanese border, which was seized by Hezbollah in early 2013.
Darkoush said whole neighbourhoods had been cleansed of their original inhabitants in Homs, and that many residents had been denied permission to return to their homes, with officials citing lack of proof that they had indeed lived there.
“The first step in the plan has been achieved,” he said. “It involved expelling the inhabitants of these areas and burning up anything which connects them to their land and homes. The second step will be replacing the original inhabitants with newcomers from Iraq and Lebanon.”
In Zabadani, Amir Berhan, director of the town’s hospital, said: “The displacement from here started in 2012 but increased dramatically in 2015. Now most of our people have already been taken to Idlib. There is a clear and obvious plan to move Sunnis from between Damascus and Homs. They have burned their homes and fields. They are telling people ‘this place is not for you anymore’.
“This is leading to the fragmentation of families. The concept of family life and ties to the land is being dissolved by all this deportation and exile. It is shredding Syrian society.”
At stake in postwar Syria, with the war beginning to ebb, is more than who lives where when the fighting finally stops. A sense of identity is also up for grabs, as is the bigger question of who gets to define the national character.
“This is not just altering the demographic balance,” said Labib al-Nahas. “This is altering the balance of influence in all of these areas and across Syria itself. Whole communities will be vulnerable. War with Iran is becoming an identity war. They want a country in their likeness, serving their interests. The region can’t tolerate that.”
Additional reporting by Suzan Haidamous
How far is Russia willing to go in Syria?
Russia seems intent on a political solution in Syria but it will have to press Assad harder to accept it.
Link
by
Yezid Sayigh
Yezid Sayigh is senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
Achieving a general ceasefire in Syria has been central to every diplomatic initiative to end the conflict since the United Nations Security Council issued a presidential statement endorsing what was known as the "Kofi Annan plan" in March 2012. But getting the combatants to comply was never going to be easy, not least because their external backers were not prepared to go far enough to make them do so.
The ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey on December 29, 2016, is no different. But this time the stakes may be high enough to force Russia's hand, opening an avenue towards more effective diplomacy, albeit geared to more modest objectives than reaching a full peace deal.
Russia has arguably sought a political settlement from the outset of its military intervention in Syria as a means both of securing a return on its investment in the Assad regime and of consolidating its claim to global power status. With Turkey now on board and bringing most of Syria's political and armed opposition with it, the main obstacle to Russian aims is the Assad regime and, behind it, Iran.
Visibly buoyed by its success in taking full control of Aleppo, the regime appears determined to subdue remaining opposition enclaves around Damascus. This prompted the armed opposition groups that had signed on to the latest ceasefire to announce it at an end on January 9, 2017. For its part, Iran refrained from sponsoring the ceasefire, although it had joined Russia and Turkey just nine days earlier in the "Moscow Declaration" calling for a truce and peace talks.
Does Russia have the influence to sway either of its allies? If not, can it afford to simply stay its current course in Syria, providing combat support indefinitely to a regime that has no real prospect of resolving severe challenges of political stability and economic regeneration even if it attains its much-vaunted "total victory" through military means?
Enforcing the ceasefire
In sharp contrast to past ceasefire agreements, Russia and Turkey have given their version some teeth by endorsing the principle of "imposing sanctions on violating parties".
Their precise form remains under discussion between the two guarantors, as Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu confirmed on January 5, and may prove too difficult to finalise. Russia is unlikely to accept Turkish and opposition demands to make the Syrian army equally liable to sanctions, and even less to approve Cavusoglu's suggestion of seeking a further Security Council resolution formalising them.
Russia faces a moment of truth in 2017: It must be ready to go to considerably greater lengths to compel the Assad regime to engage politically, or to go home.
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But Russia has signalled a potentially important shift simply by endorsing the idea of enforcement, as well as agreeing to joint monitoring on the ground by Turkish and Russian observers. Its air strikes supporting the Turkish-backed Euphrates Shield force battling the Islamic State in al-Bab on December 30, 2016, were also significant: although clearly intended as a positive gesture towards Turkey, they are the only instance in the entire Syrian conflict of direct air support by any power for the armed opposition.
And by announcing the withdrawal of its aircraft carrier group from Syrian waters on January 6, 2017, on the grounds that it had completed its mission, Russia signalled its readiness to scale down combat operations to the regime.
Russia has other, non-lethal options for ratcheting up its political pressure on Bashar al-Assad. It has already enhanced the status of seven of the most important armed formations by treating them as an opposition leadership, and withdrawn its previous rejection of several of them as "terrorist" organisations.
Russia has also entertained Turkish and opposition proposals to engage with local administrative councils in opposition-held areas; these mesh with draft Russianproposals for decentralisation of power in Syria floated since last March, and if implemented would open the way for future provision of humanitarian assistance and economic aid for rebuilding.
Pressuring Assad
Of course, little of this will be put to the test so long as Assad continues to reject these proposals outright. He may, moreover, expect to be let off the hook once US President-elect Donald Trump is sworn in, leaving him little reason to submit to Russian pressure.
Iran probably expects to be targeted by the incoming US administration, and consequently will be even less willing to relinquish its position in Syria. For these two allies, Russia has already run out of time to bring about its preferred outcome there.
Russia faces a moment of truth in 2017: It must be ready to go to considerably greater lengths to compel the Assad regime to engage politically, or to go home. It is likely to do neither, but cannot afford to remain stuck instead with an ongoing military commitment and no political strategy, having surrendered the latter to Assad and Iran.
A more sensible alternative would be to focus on reinforcing the ceasefire and elaborating effective monitoring mechanisms, increasing contacts with the armed and political wings of the Syrian opposition, and helping Turkey, United Nations agencies, and other international partners to assist basic public services and infrastructure in opposition areas.
This could improve chances for eventual peace-making, but at worst it cannot harm them.
Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut.
Thursday, January 12, 2017
Wednesday, January 11, 2017
كسورية وليبيا
سلامة كيلة
كل إعلام النظم، وحتى الإعلام الغربي، يكرّر لازمة هي: كسورية وليبيا، مشيراً إلى أن على الشعوب أن تقبل بما تفرضه النظم من نهبٍ عليها، ومن سحق، أفضل من أن تعاني ما تعانيه كل من سورية وليبيا. على الشعوب أن تقبل كل السياسات الاقتصادية التي يفرضها صندوق النقد الدولي، وكل النهب الذي تقوم به الطبقة المسيطرة، والتي تتحكّم في الدولة. هذا هو ملخص الخطاب المعمم، من كل الرأسماليات المركزية والطرفية، وهي "مضطرة" إلى زيادة النهب، وبالتالي، إغراق الشعوب بالفقر الأشدّ من الشديد، الذي يؤدي إلى الموت جوعاً.
يعني ذلك أن الرأسماليات مصمّمة على زيادة النهب، ولا تستطيع التراجع عن ذلك، أو حتى التخفيف منه، فقد لاحظنا أنه على الرغم من أن الثورات عبّرت عن انحدار الوضع المعيشي للشعوب، نتيجة هذه السياسة الاقتصادية، إلا أن النظم استمرت في السياسات نفسها التي أوصلت إلى ذلك، وبخطواتٍ أشدّ حدّة. لهذا، تميل إلى تخويف الشعوب، سواء بإظهار القوة وتشديد العنف، أو عبر خطابٍ تخويفي عنوانه: سورية وليبيا. لكن، يمكن أن نسأل: لماذا حدث ذلك في سورية وليبيا؟ هل هو خطأ تمرُّد الشعوب، أو نتيجة وضع تاريخي فرضته النظم ذاتها، وصنعته هي بالذات؟
دمّرت النظم السياسة والتعليم، وأفقرت الشعوب، وبنت وجودها على أساس سياسة ليبرالية متوحشة اتسمت بالنهب الشامل. وحينما ثارت هذه الشعوب واجهتها بكل وحشية، لأن عليها أن تقبل كل هذا النهب، من دون أن تعترض أو تحتج. وكانت هذه الوحشية هي ما فتح على كل التدخلات الخارجية، سواء لأن الرأسماليات تريد تدمير الثورة قبل أن تصل إليها، أو لأنها تريد حصةً من خلال السيطرة. تتعلق المسألة، إذن، بالنظم ذاتها، بميلها إلى الإفقار الشديد للشعوب، وميلها إلى سحق هذه الشعوب حينما تثور.
يعني ذلك أن الرأسماليات مصمّمة على زيادة النهب، ولا تستطيع التراجع عن ذلك، أو حتى التخفيف منه، فقد لاحظنا أنه على الرغم من أن الثورات عبّرت عن انحدار الوضع المعيشي للشعوب، نتيجة هذه السياسة الاقتصادية، إلا أن النظم استمرت في السياسات نفسها التي أوصلت إلى ذلك، وبخطواتٍ أشدّ حدّة. لهذا، تميل إلى تخويف الشعوب، سواء بإظهار القوة وتشديد العنف، أو عبر خطابٍ تخويفي عنوانه: سورية وليبيا. لكن، يمكن أن نسأل: لماذا حدث ذلك في سورية وليبيا؟ هل هو خطأ تمرُّد الشعوب، أو نتيجة وضع تاريخي فرضته النظم ذاتها، وصنعته هي بالذات؟
دمّرت النظم السياسة والتعليم، وأفقرت الشعوب، وبنت وجودها على أساس سياسة ليبرالية متوحشة اتسمت بالنهب الشامل. وحينما ثارت هذه الشعوب واجهتها بكل وحشية، لأن عليها أن تقبل كل هذا النهب، من دون أن تعترض أو تحتج. وكانت هذه الوحشية هي ما فتح على كل التدخلات الخارجية، سواء لأن الرأسماليات تريد تدمير الثورة قبل أن تصل إليها، أو لأنها تريد حصةً من خلال السيطرة. تتعلق المسألة، إذن، بالنظم ذاتها، بميلها إلى الإفقار الشديد للشعوب، وميلها إلى سحق هذه الشعوب حينما تثور.
بالتالي، ما معنى التخويف بسورية وليبيا؟ إنه يعني ضمن السياسة التي تتبعها النظم (التي تستخدم خطاب التخويف) أن على الشعوب أن تقبل الموت جوعاً، بدل أن تموت قتلاً. هكذا بالضبط. فالشعوب لم تَثُرْ "بمزاجها"، وهي أصلاً لا تميل لا إلى الثورة ولا إلى مخالفة النظم. لكن تثور، وبكل جرأة، حينما ينحدر وضعها إلى حالةٍ من الهاوية، حيث تعجز عن العيش، هكذا بالضبط تعجز عن العيش. وسبب ذلك هو نهب الطبقة المسيطرة وسطوة نظمها. بالتالي، ما قيمة التخويف هنا؟ وما قيمة الميل إلى السيطرة الشديدة، وممارسة القمع والضبط والاعتقال؟ لا شيء، بالضبط لأن ذلك كله يؤثر فقط في أشخاصٍ يخشون ما يخسرونه. لهذا، يبرّرون القبول بالأمر الواقع، ويكرّرون خطاب النظم، ويخوّفون بـ "سورية وليبيا". لكنه لا يؤثر في منْ يقف على حافة الموت جوعاً، حيث يتصرّف "غريزياً"، ومن ثم لا يعود يحسب لما يمكن أن يحدث معه، لأن ما يمكن أن يحدث معه هو حادث معه. التخويف من الموت قتلاً لا يخيف من يقف على حافة الموت جوعاً. الموت واحدٌ بغض النظر عن طريقة حدوثه، هكذا بالضبط.
في الواقع، تعمم الرأسماليات خطاب الخوف من الثورة، وهي تدفع الشعوب إلى الثورة. ولهذا، ليس من أثر لخطابها إلا للفئات التي هي ليست في وضع كارثي، بل إنها تعيش. ولهذا، يبدو خطاب التخويف هذا وكأنه خطاب لـ "الذات"، أي للنظم نفسها التي تريد أن تطمئن على أن استمرار نهبها والتوحّش في النهب لن يفضي إلى الثورة. هو مراوغة ذاتية لتبرير الإمعان في النهب، والقناعة بأنها قادرةٌ على ذلك، بعد أن أخافت الشعوب. وبالتالي، هو خطاب يدلّ على رُعب النظم وخوفها من الثورة، وبالتالي، حاجتها لما يُطمئنها بأن المجزرة الوحشية التي حصلت في سورية، والحرب الدموية التي تجري في ليبيا، كفيلتان بأن تمنعا الثورة ضدها.
لكن، وصل الوضع إلى لحظةٍ بات التخويف فيها بلا جدوى، فالموت يحيط بالشعوب، ولا حلّ أمامها سوى الثورة. هذه حالةٌ غريزيةٌ لا يوقفها العقل، بل يجب أن يُنجحها العقل.
Tuesday, January 10, 2017
عن الغالب والمغلوب وحجم الغلبة في حرب سوريا: إيران
جلبير الأشقر
Link
بعد تناولنا في مقال الأسبوع الماضي للاعبيْن الدولييْن الرئيسييْن في الساحة السورية، أمريكا وروسيا، ننتقل إلى النظر في محصّلة حرب سوريا في بداية سنة 2017 بالنسبة للاعبيْن الإقليمييْن الرئيسييْن، وهما إيران وتركيا، بادئين بإيران.
ولا بدّ قبل ذلك من ملاحظة تتعلّق بعدم إدراجنا لأي دولة عربية في فئة «لاعب إقليمي رئيسي». والحال أن سنة 2016 انتهت بشبه إخراج للمعامليْن العربييْن الأبرز، ألا وهما المملكة السعودية وإمارة قطر، من المعادلة السورية كما تجلّت في الصفقة التي أشرفت روسيا على عقدها بين إيران وتركيا. فكما جاء في عنوان تعليق كريستوف عيّاد، المسؤول عن الصفحات الدولية في صحيفة «لوموند» الفرنسية، في 30 كانون الأول/ديسمبر الماضي، «تتحكّم ثلاث دول بالنزاع السوري ليست أي منها عربية». أما العامل الأهم في خروج دول الخليج العربية من المعادلة السورية، فهو بلا شك حرب اليمن. فبعد أن كان النزاع في سوريا شاغلها الأمني الأول في سنوات 2012-2015، فاقه النزاع اليمني أولوية لديها وتفاقمت الأمور مع تفاقم القلاقل في علاقاتها مع الولايات المتحدة دولياً ومصر عربياً.
هذا وخلافاً لإجماع التعليقات على تعيين روسيا فلاديمير بوتين كالفائز الأكبر في حرب سوريا، على الأقل كما تبدو الأمور منذ نهاية العام الماضي، كانت التعليقات متباينة فيما يخصّ المحصّلة بالنسبة لإيران. والواقع أن هذه المحصّلة هي ذاتها متباينة: فمن جهة، انتهزت طهران فرصة النزاع في سوريا كي تمدّ سيطرتها المباشرة إلى الساحة السورية بعد الساحة العراقية، وتستكمل فيها نشر قواتها الخاصة والقوات الواقعة تحت إمرتها، عراقية كانت أم لبنانية أم أفغانية، بما يشكّل جسراً استراتيجياً متواصلاً يمتد من إيران إلى الساحلين السوري واللبناني على البحر المتوسط وإلى تخوم الدولة الصهيونية، مصدر التهديد الأكبر الذي باتت طهران تواجهه بعد أن أبرمت الاتفاق النووي مع المجموعة الدولية وضمنت بذلك علاقات أكثر هدوءًا مع الولايات المتحدة برئاسة باراك أوباما.
ولا بدّ قبل ذلك من ملاحظة تتعلّق بعدم إدراجنا لأي دولة عربية في فئة «لاعب إقليمي رئيسي». والحال أن سنة 2016 انتهت بشبه إخراج للمعامليْن العربييْن الأبرز، ألا وهما المملكة السعودية وإمارة قطر، من المعادلة السورية كما تجلّت في الصفقة التي أشرفت روسيا على عقدها بين إيران وتركيا. فكما جاء في عنوان تعليق كريستوف عيّاد، المسؤول عن الصفحات الدولية في صحيفة «لوموند» الفرنسية، في 30 كانون الأول/ديسمبر الماضي، «تتحكّم ثلاث دول بالنزاع السوري ليست أي منها عربية». أما العامل الأهم في خروج دول الخليج العربية من المعادلة السورية، فهو بلا شك حرب اليمن. فبعد أن كان النزاع في سوريا شاغلها الأمني الأول في سنوات 2012-2015، فاقه النزاع اليمني أولوية لديها وتفاقمت الأمور مع تفاقم القلاقل في علاقاتها مع الولايات المتحدة دولياً ومصر عربياً.
هذا وخلافاً لإجماع التعليقات على تعيين روسيا فلاديمير بوتين كالفائز الأكبر في حرب سوريا، على الأقل كما تبدو الأمور منذ نهاية العام الماضي، كانت التعليقات متباينة فيما يخصّ المحصّلة بالنسبة لإيران. والواقع أن هذه المحصّلة هي ذاتها متباينة: فمن جهة، انتهزت طهران فرصة النزاع في سوريا كي تمدّ سيطرتها المباشرة إلى الساحة السورية بعد الساحة العراقية، وتستكمل فيها نشر قواتها الخاصة والقوات الواقعة تحت إمرتها، عراقية كانت أم لبنانية أم أفغانية، بما يشكّل جسراً استراتيجياً متواصلاً يمتد من إيران إلى الساحلين السوري واللبناني على البحر المتوسط وإلى تخوم الدولة الصهيونية، مصدر التهديد الأكبر الذي باتت طهران تواجهه بعد أن أبرمت الاتفاق النووي مع المجموعة الدولية وضمنت بذلك علاقات أكثر هدوءًا مع الولايات المتحدة برئاسة باراك أوباما.
لكنّ الأمور أعقد مما يبدو للوهلة الأولى. فمن جهة أخرى، تظهر إيران كأنها وقعت في فخ انتشارٍ يفوق طاقتها. وقد يكون سكوت الدولة الصهيونية عن هذا الانتشار، بما فيه عدم اعتراضها على تدخّل «حزب الله» اللبناني في الساحة السورية بينما كان بوسعها منعه، قد يكون سكوتها هذا ناجماً عن إدراكها أن تورّط إيران في تمدّدٍ يتجاوز قدراتها الاقتصادية (وهي مضغوطة بسبب العقوبات وانخفاض أسعار النفط، فضلاً عن الفعالية الاقتصادية المتدنّية للنظام الإيراني) والعسكرية سواءً، من شأنه أن يُرهقها على المدى المتوسط.
والحقيقة أن تطورات الأوضاع العسكرية في عامي 2014 و2015 قد أثبتت ضعف إيران مصحوبة بأتباعها، وليس قوّتها. والسبب الأول لضعفها هو هزالة سلاح الجو لديها، الذي يعود قسم هام منه إلى عام 1974 وقسم هام آخر إلى عام 1991. وقد انكشف عجز حلفاء طهران العراقيين، يساندهم مباشرة ويؤطّرهم «فيلق القدس» الإيراني، عجزهم عن الصمود في وجه هجمة شنّتها داعش بأعداد هزيلة بالمقارنة بأعدادهم. لا بل انفضح خوفهم من استيلاء داعش على بغداد، ناهيكم بعجزهم عن قلعها بمفردهم من المناطق الشاسعة التي سيطرت عليها داخل العراق. وقد اضطُرّت طهران إلى القبول باستنجاد حلفائها العراقيين بالولايات المتحدة ووسائطها الجوية، بما في ذلك تلبيتهم الشرط الذي فرضته هذه الأخيرة، ألا وهو تنحّي نوري المالكي التابع لإيران من رئاسة الوزراء واستبداله بحيدر العبادي المقبول لدى واشنطن.
وكذلك فقد انكشف عام 2015 عجز القوات التابعة لإيران المتدخّلة على الساحة السورية، بمشاركةٍ وتوجيهٍ من «فيلق القدس» ذاته، إلى جانب قوات النظام السوري النظامية وغير النظامية، عجزها جميعاً عن الصمود في وجه قوات المعارضة السورية بالرغم من تفوّق معسكر النظام بالعدد والعتاد وتفوّقه الأهم المتمثّل باحتكاره لسلاح الجو، أداة التدمير والقتل الرئيسية في حرب سوريا. هنا اضطُرّت طهران إلى القبول باستنجاد حليفها السوري بروسيا، بما انطوى عليه هذا الاستنجاد من تحجيم لنفوذ طهران في الساحة السورية لصالح توسّع النفوذ الروسي.
وتتجلّى المعادلة بكامل تعقيدها وهشاشة موقف إيران في تلقّي كل من أطراف هذا الحلف الثلاثي لنبأ فوز دونالد ترامب بالرئاسة الأمريكية. فبينما ارتاحت موسكو ودمشق لتلك النتيجة (التي كان لموسكو يدٌ في صنعها) وتنفستا الصعداء، رأت فيها طهران خطراً كبيراً على مصالحها. فإن ترامب الذي يشهر نيّته التعاون مع بوتين والذي سبق أن صرّح بتفضيله نظام آل الأسد على معارضيه (وهو بذلك يلتقي مع صديقه بنيامين نتانياهو)، هو نفسه الذي دعا إلى نقض الاتفاق النووي المعقود مع إيران (مثل نتانياهو أيضاً) ويصرّ على تصنيف هذه الأخيرة في «محور الشرّ» الذي حشرها فيه ذات يوم جورج دبليو بوش وأخرجها منه أوباما.
فبينما ينظر بوتين وآل الأسد إلى المستقبل بدرجة عالية من التفاؤل، ولو مصحوباً بشيء من الحذر، تنظر إليه طهران عن حقّ بقلق شديد، لا سيما وأن الرئيس الأمريكي المنتخب عيّن على رأس البنتاغون جنرالاً أحاله أوباما على التقاعد بسبب إصراره على تصعيد المواجهة العسكرية مع إيران، كما بيّن تضامنه المطلق مع الدولة الصهيونية قبل حتى أن يستلم مقاليد الرئاسة.
والحقيقة أن تطورات الأوضاع العسكرية في عامي 2014 و2015 قد أثبتت ضعف إيران مصحوبة بأتباعها، وليس قوّتها. والسبب الأول لضعفها هو هزالة سلاح الجو لديها، الذي يعود قسم هام منه إلى عام 1974 وقسم هام آخر إلى عام 1991. وقد انكشف عجز حلفاء طهران العراقيين، يساندهم مباشرة ويؤطّرهم «فيلق القدس» الإيراني، عجزهم عن الصمود في وجه هجمة شنّتها داعش بأعداد هزيلة بالمقارنة بأعدادهم. لا بل انفضح خوفهم من استيلاء داعش على بغداد، ناهيكم بعجزهم عن قلعها بمفردهم من المناطق الشاسعة التي سيطرت عليها داخل العراق. وقد اضطُرّت طهران إلى القبول باستنجاد حلفائها العراقيين بالولايات المتحدة ووسائطها الجوية، بما في ذلك تلبيتهم الشرط الذي فرضته هذه الأخيرة، ألا وهو تنحّي نوري المالكي التابع لإيران من رئاسة الوزراء واستبداله بحيدر العبادي المقبول لدى واشنطن.
وكذلك فقد انكشف عام 2015 عجز القوات التابعة لإيران المتدخّلة على الساحة السورية، بمشاركةٍ وتوجيهٍ من «فيلق القدس» ذاته، إلى جانب قوات النظام السوري النظامية وغير النظامية، عجزها جميعاً عن الصمود في وجه قوات المعارضة السورية بالرغم من تفوّق معسكر النظام بالعدد والعتاد وتفوّقه الأهم المتمثّل باحتكاره لسلاح الجو، أداة التدمير والقتل الرئيسية في حرب سوريا. هنا اضطُرّت طهران إلى القبول باستنجاد حليفها السوري بروسيا، بما انطوى عليه هذا الاستنجاد من تحجيم لنفوذ طهران في الساحة السورية لصالح توسّع النفوذ الروسي.
وتتجلّى المعادلة بكامل تعقيدها وهشاشة موقف إيران في تلقّي كل من أطراف هذا الحلف الثلاثي لنبأ فوز دونالد ترامب بالرئاسة الأمريكية. فبينما ارتاحت موسكو ودمشق لتلك النتيجة (التي كان لموسكو يدٌ في صنعها) وتنفستا الصعداء، رأت فيها طهران خطراً كبيراً على مصالحها. فإن ترامب الذي يشهر نيّته التعاون مع بوتين والذي سبق أن صرّح بتفضيله نظام آل الأسد على معارضيه (وهو بذلك يلتقي مع صديقه بنيامين نتانياهو)، هو نفسه الذي دعا إلى نقض الاتفاق النووي المعقود مع إيران (مثل نتانياهو أيضاً) ويصرّ على تصنيف هذه الأخيرة في «محور الشرّ» الذي حشرها فيه ذات يوم جورج دبليو بوش وأخرجها منه أوباما.
فبينما ينظر بوتين وآل الأسد إلى المستقبل بدرجة عالية من التفاؤل، ولو مصحوباً بشيء من الحذر، تنظر إليه طهران عن حقّ بقلق شديد، لا سيما وأن الرئيس الأمريكي المنتخب عيّن على رأس البنتاغون جنرالاً أحاله أوباما على التقاعد بسبب إصراره على تصعيد المواجهة العسكرية مع إيران، كما بيّن تضامنه المطلق مع الدولة الصهيونية قبل حتى أن يستلم مقاليد الرئاسة.
ومشكلة طهران أنها لا تستطيع المراهنة على موسكو ولا على دمشق مثلما تعتمد على حليفها اللبناني «حزب الله»، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر، إذ أن أواصر الولاء الأيديولوجي والارتهان المادّي التي تربط الحزب بطهران لا يقابلها أي مثيل سواءً أفي علاقة إيران مع النظام البعثي أم في علاقتها مع روسيا النيوقيصرية (neo-Tsarist). فلو وفى ترامب بوعده ونسج علاقات تعاون سياسي واقتصادي مع روسيا بوتين، يصبح من المرجّح أن يساير هذا الأخير واشنطن بالعمل على إخراج القوى التابعة لطهران من الساحة السورية بدعم أمريكي وربّما تركي.
أما آل الأسد، الذين انقلبوا على تحالف المقاومة الفلسطينية والحركة الوطنية اللبنانية وتدخّلوا في لبنان عام 1976 بضوء أخضر أمريكي ـ إسرائيلي ضاربين عرض الحائط باعتراض راعيهم الأول الاتحاد السوفييتي، والذين انضمّوا إلى الائتلاف الدولي الذي انقضّ على العراق سنة 1991 بقيادة الولايات المتحدة، أما آل الأسد هؤلاء فلن يتردّدوا في الانقلاب على إيران لو خُيّروا بينها وبين تحالف واشنطن وموسكو، الأقوى والأغنى بما لا يُقاس.
٭ كاتب وأكاديمي من لبنان
Monday, January 9, 2017
"حماس" تستهجن إدانة تركيا لعملية القدس
AHHHH......THE "NEW" TURKEY!
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استهجنت حركة المقاومة الإسلامية "حماس" موقف رئيس الوزراء التركي بن علي يلدريم، ونائبه محمد شيمشيك، بإدانة عملية جبل المكبر بمدينة القدس المحتلة، والتي أسفرت عن مقتل أربعة جنود إسرائيليين وإصابة أكثر من 15 آخرين بجراح مختلفة.
وقال المتحدث باسم الحركة حازم قاسم، في تصريح صحافي، "إن المقاومة التي يمارسها الشعب الفلسطيني على امتداد أرضه المحتلة هي حق مشروع ومكفول بالقوانين الدولية".
وأوضح قاسم أن "الإرهاب الحقيقي هو ما يمارسه الاحتلال بحق شعبنا، والمجازر التي يمارسها ضد الفلسطينيين".
وأكد أن الحركة تقدر المواقف التركية الرئاسية والحكومية والشعبية الداعمة للقضية الفلسطينية، ورفض اعتداءات الاحتلال بحق شعبنا وسعيها في رفع الحصار عن قطاع غزة.
Sunday, January 8, 2017
REVEALED: Secret tapes expose Israeli influence over UK Conservative Party
Israeli embassy-linked political operators discuss 'taking down' foreign minister Alan Duncan and boast of planting parliamentary questions
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Saturday 7 January 2017 10:37 UTC
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LONDON - A senior political officer at the Israeli Embassy in London has been secretly filmed talking about how he would like to "take down" UK foreign office minister Alan Duncan, a vocal opponent of illegal Israeli settlement building in the West Bank.
He said Duncan, who is one of the few Conservative ministers to speak out over settlements, was causing "a lot of problems". He also called Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, "an idiot".
In a separate conversation with the embassy staffer, Crispin Blunt, the chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, was described as being "on the hit list" for his views which were "strongly pro-Arab rather than pro-Israel".
The revelations provoked an immediate political reaction, with Desmond Swayne, a former Conservative minister and parliamentary aide to former prime minister David Cameron, calling for the incident to be "investigated thoroughly".
"What we cannot have is Israel acting in the UK with the same impunity it enjoys in Palestine," he told Middle East Eye. "This is clearly interference in another country's politics of the murkiest and most discreditable kind."
In a statement on Saturday night, the Israeli embassy said that Mark Regev, Israel's ambassador to the UK, had spoken to Duncan to apologise and that Regev had made clear that the embassy considered the remarks to be "completely unacceptable".
PRESS RELEASE @IsraelinUK and @foreignoffice comments regarding remarks made by embassy employee
A spokesperson for the UK's foreign office also confirmed that Regev had apologised.
"The Israeli ambassador has apologised and is clear these comments do not reflect the views of the embassy or government of Israel," he said. "The UK has a strong relationship with Israel and we consider the matter closed."
PETER OBORNE: Duncan's opposition to settlements makes him Israeli target
The undercover recording, which exposes how Israeli influence extends to senior levels of the governing Conservative Party, also includes a conversation in which an assistant to another Conservative minister described how she used her position to plant parliamentary questions supportive of Israel.
Shai Masot, Political Officer for the Israeli Embassy (Al Jazeera)
The conversation was filmed by Al Jazeera's investigative unit at a restaurant in London last year and features Shai Masot, the embassy's political officer, and Maria Strizzolo, a former parliamentary assistant to Robert Halfon, a junior education minister and former Conservative Party deputy chairman. She also mentions meeting Masot's bosses at the Ministry of Strategic Affairs several times in Israel.
Speaking to an undercover reporter posing as a pro-Israel political activist, Strizzolo boasted of how she had taken on Halfon, the MP for Harlow in Essex, when he was a backbencher: "And now look at him, he's a minister, so I'm not too crap!"
Machiavellian-inspired operator
Masot, who in an online profile deactivated on Saturday described Niccolo Machiavelli as his "God," then asked her whether she could do the opposite: "Can I give you some MPs that you can take down?"
Strizzolo, who is now a UK government employee working at the Department for Education's Skills Funding Agency, replied: "Well you know, if you look hard enough I'm sure that there is something they are trying to hide."
Masot said: "Yeah, I have some MPs."
Strizzolo said: "Let’s talk about it."
Masot then told the reporter: "No, she knows which MPs I want to take down."
Strizzolo replied that it would be good to remind her, and Masot then said: "The deputy foreign minister."
This did not come as a surprise to Strizzolo, who replied: "You still want to go for it?"
Masot said: "No, he's doing a lot of problems."
Shai Masot and Maria Strizzolo (Al Jazeera)
Strizzolo then recounted an encounter between Duncan and Halfon, her boss, in which she alleged that Duncan had threatened to "destroy" him. Halfon allegedly reported the incident to the party whips, who told him to "calm down".
The conversation about what to do about Duncan then continued, with Masot saying: "Never say never, yeah but ...", and Strizzolo suggesting: "A little scandal maybe?"
In response to the revelations, Crispin Blunt told MEE that the "Israelis need to explain what's going on".
"While this apparent activity of a representative of a foreign state in the politics of the United Kingdom is formally outrageous and deserving of investigation, the real questions should be for the state of Israel itself," he said.
"Israel's future peace and security is not being served by ignoring the substantial peace lobby in both Israel and the worldwide Jewish community and working to undermine those foreign politicians who share that perspective."
Duncan became a target for Israel in 2014 when he produced a blistering attack on Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which he said amounted to a wicked cocktail of occupation and illegality, a system akin to apartheid which brought shame on the Israeli government.
The speech was one of the strongest attacks on Benjamin Netanyahu's government by a British front-bench politician.
Duncan said: "Settlements are illegal colonies built in someone else's country. They are an act of theft, and what is more something which is both initiated and supported by the state of Israel."
BDS is not the only tactic against Israeli occupation, but it is working
The exchange about Duncan is among hours of conversations recorded over a period of months, which reveal how Masot sought to manipulate the political debate over Israel and Palestine within both the Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party.
The Al Jazeera reporter gained Masot's trust and infiltrated his circle so effectively that he was offered a job by the embassy to help combat the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign in Britain.
The strategy, which is described in the tapes by a senior member of AIPAC, the influential pro-Israel lobbying organisation in the US, is to detach Britain from pro-Palestinian sentiment in Europe and bring the UK closer to the US.
The embassy tapes reveal the extent to which Israel has penetrated the Conservative Party through an organisation called the Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI) for whom both Halfon and Strizzolo had worked.
The strength of Conservative support for Israel was highlighted last week in comments by a spokesperson for Prime Minister Theresa May, which appeared to criticise US Secretary of State John Kerry's recent speech in which he said that Israeli government policy was being driven by "extreme elements".
"We do not believe that it is appropriate to attack the composition of the democratically elected government of an ally," the spokesperson said.
The Daily Mail featured a response critical of May headlined, Poisonous conduct is a disgrace: Minister who served in David Cameron's government says it is time to end the problem of Israel buying UK policy, in which the former minister wrote: "The reason is clear: the Conservative Party wants pro-Israel donors' money, and principle in the Government's foreign policy has been relegated.
"Lots of countries try to force their views on others, but what is scandalous in the UK is that instead of resisting it, successive Governments have submitted to it, taken donors' money, and allowed Israeli influence-peddling to shape policy and even determine the fate of Ministers. Even now, if I were to reveal who I am, I would be subjected to a relentless barrage of abuse and character assassination," the former minister wrote.
"It now seems clear people in the Conservative and Labour Parties have been working with the Israeli embassy which has used them to demonise and trash MPs who criticise Israel; an army of Israel's useless idiots in Parliament. This is politically corrupt, and diplomatically indefensible," the former minister wrote, concluding that: "We need a full inquiry into the Israeli Embassy, the links, access and funding ... and an undertaking from all political parties that they welcome the financial and political support of the UK Jewish community, but won't accept any engagement linked to Israel until it stops building illegally on Palestinian land."
The tapes also expose how the Israeli embassy has helped to establish, and in some cases has directly funded, a number of organisations that claim to be independent of it. This includes the Union of Jewish Students and a group for aspiring diplomats called Young Diplomatic London, to which Masot was on the executive committee
Strizzolo said that "pretty much" all Tory MPs belonged to the CFI, including Theresa May, Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond and Boris Johnson.
She also claimed credit for a question asked by Halfon at the time of the kidnap and suspected murder by Hamas of three Israeli settler youths in the West Bank in June 2014.
The incident contributed to tensions which led to Israel's assault on Gaza the following month in which more than 2,000 Palestinians died, according to United Nations figures.
Strizzolo, who was in Israel with the CFI at the time, said: "And I was on the phone with Rob [Halfon] to convince him to table a question for Prime Minister's Question Time, paying tribute ..."
The reporter interrupted: "Did he do it?"
Strizzolo continued: "Yeah. And also tabled in an urgent question to ... get a statement from the government on the three kids."
'Hamas is Hamas is Hamas': How UK minister spoke up for Israel
Halfon spoke about the incident in parliament on 2 July 2014, putting the following question to then-prime minister David Cameron: "The world has seen the tragic and brutal murders of three Israeli youngsters, most probably by Hamas.
"Will my right honourable friend give the Israeli government every possible support at this time? Does he agree that, far from showing restraint, Israel must do everything possible to take out Hamas terrorist networks, and will he give the Israeli government support in that?"
Cameron replied that he knew Halfon to be "passionate about these issues," but said that security operations needed to be conducted with care to avoid further escalation.
"It is very important that Britain will stand with Israel as it seeks to bring to justice those who are responsible. The people responsible for this should be found and brought to justice," he said.
Strizzolo also revealed she "prepared everything" for MPs so it was hard for them to say no.
"So you literally prepare everything for them, it's harder from them to say: 'Oh no, I don’t have the time, you know.' So if they already have the questions to table for PMQs, it’s harder to say, 'Oh no, no, no, I won’t do it.'"
Halfon had not responded to requests for comment at the time of publication.
Masot, a former major in the Israeli navy, described his position at the embassy as a "political posting" and explained that he was not a "career diplomat".
He said he worked for the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, which was set up by Netanyahu to conduct what has been described in Israel as a secret war against the BDS movement.
Israeli ambassador Mark Regev speaking at an event at the Labour party conference in 2016 (Al Jazeera)
Masot said Mark Regev, the current Israeli ambassador to the UK, was a friend, though in a revealing episode he hinted that he considered him too dovish.
"Mark Regev, he's all the time asking me, yeah he's a good friend," he said.
"Yeah, but that's the thing with Netanyahu usually the people that surround him are really nice, they are comfortable, they are comfortable people. Mark is a great person but he's not the guy that will go for a war."
In a statement, Strizzolo said her conversation with Masot had been "tongue in cheek and gossipy" and had taken place "in a social context".
"Any suggestion that I, as a civil servant working in education, could ever exert the type of influence you are suggesting is risible," she added.
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